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On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the nation’s first comprehensive 
health care reform bill, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
Within weeks, twenty states filed law-
suits challenging the constitutionality 
of its most politically charged feature—
an individual purchase mandate. By 
2014, the bill requires most individuals 
to have health insurance. With certain 
exceptions (pertaining to income level 
and religious objections), individuals 
without qualifying coverage will pay an 
annual tax penalty reaching the greater 
of $695 ($2,085 per family maximum) 
or 2.5 percent of household income.1
If anything, the tax penalty is too low 
compared with the cost of insurance, so 
it may not provide sufficient incentive 
for healthy individuals to purchase in-
surance. But it remains controversial 
because it compels people to purchase 
coverage they choose not to have, rais-
ing the question whether Congress can 
lawfully and ethically require individu-
als to contract with, and transfer money 
to, a private party.2 To be sure, the indi-
vidual mandate lacks a clear American 
precedent. (It has worked successfully 
in other countries, such as Australia.) 
Compulsory automobile insurance, for 
example, is a state requirement, operates 
as a condition of exercising the privilege 
of driving, and requires coverage for in-
juries to others (not the insured).
Personal Freedom and Collective 
Goods in Conflict
Opposing a mandate is understand-able when viewed from an indi-
vidual perspective: it interferes with 
economic freedom and constrains per-
sonal choice. In economic terms, it 
represents a compelled cross-subsidy. 
However, when viewed from a collective 
perspective, the mandate offers valuable 
social benefits. The absence of health in-
surance creates harmful consequences, 
including lower quality of life, increased 
morbidity and mortality, and higher fi-
nancial burdens.3
Since these adverse consequences fall 
mostly on those who lack insurance, 
the decision to seek insurance argu-
ably should be left to them. However, 
government is responsible for the well-
being of the community, not particular 
individuals. Even if the decision were 
primarily self-regarding, its effects—ill-
ness and death—can be felt by all.
Many individuals cannot afford in-
surance, but others choose not to insure; 
over nine million people with annual 
incomes over seventy-five thousand dol-
lars had no coverage in 2007.4 Yet many 
previously healthy people suffer illness 
or injury and end up requiring treat-
ment in emergency departments, most 
of which is uncompensated. “Free rid-
ers” rely on society to pick up the costs 
(forty-three billion dollars in 2008) 
through higher insurance premiums 
(above one thousand dollars annu-
ally) and higher taxes (such as hospital 
subsidies, Medicaid, and Medicare). 
Individuals often delay purchasing in-
surance until they become ill, creating 
an “adverse selection” problem for in-
surers. At its worst, free-riding and ad-
verse selection create a downward spiral 
of higher premiums and a shrinking in-
surance pool, making everyone’s health 
care less affordable.5
The Mandate’s Constitutionality
The pivotal constitutional concern is that government will penalize 
individuals for failing to buy health 
insurance—for “doing nothing”—sim-
ply because they are legal residents of 
the United States. The states could 
undoubtedly mandate health coverage, 
as with the Massachusetts Health Care 
Reform Plan of 2006. But the federal 
government has limited power; its prin-
cipal enumerated powers are to regulate 
interstate commerce and to tax for the 
general welfare. The Supreme Court, 
however, has broadly construed federal 
powers—known as the “implied pow-
ers” doctrine—to uphold laws that are 
“necessary and proper.” By this reason-
ing, the Court ought to uphold the 
constitutionality of the health insurance 
mandate.
The power to regulate interstate com-
merce. The Supreme Court has inter-
preted the commerce power broadly, 
applying it to virtually every aspect of 
economic and social life. Indeed, from 
1937 to 1995, the Court did not in-
validate a single federal statute on the 
ground that Congress lacked the power 
to regulate commerce. Critics claim, 
however, that the individual mandates 
do not regulate activity of any kind, 
whether economic or not, but rather 
regulate “doing nothing at all.”6 An in-
dividual decision not to purchase health 
insurance, they argue, also has negligi-
ble economic consequences, with purely 
personal and intrastate impacts.
Nothing could be farther from the 
truth. In terms of health, individuals 
never really “do nothing.” Uninsured in-
dividuals self-insure, rely on family, and 
cost-shift to hospitals, the insured, and 
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taxpayers. The cumulative economic ef-
fects are vast. Health care captures more 
than 17 percent of gross domestic prod-
uct. Health care professionals, pharma-
ceuticals, medical equipment, digital 
medical records, and insurance claims 
routinely move across state lines. The 
insurance industry, moreover, clearly 
operates within the stream of interstate 
commerce: marketing products, offer-
ing policies for sale, underwriting, and 
reimbursing claims. Low coverage rates 
and greater health care costs contribute 
to medical bankruptcies, unemploy-
ment, and reduced consumer spending 
and business competitiveness.
The Supreme Court has upheld 
far-reaching federal regulation on the 
ground that though individual econom-
ic activity may be negligible, collective 
consequences can become deeply conse-
quential. In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court 
held that the commerce clause empow-
ered Congress to prohibit personal cul-
tivation and use of medical marijuana. 
The Court found “striking similarities” 
between Raich and a 1942 case uphold-
ing a federal prohibition on a farmer 
growing wheat for his own use.7 The 
Court said that its prior decisions strik-
ing down the federal Gun-Free School 
Zones Act and the federal Violence 
Against Women Act, on the ground 
that those laws exceeded congressional 
authority, were read “far too broadly.”8
The power to tax. The individual 
mandate is enforced though a federal 
tax, enabling Congress also to rely on 
its enumerated power to raise taxes for 
the general welfare. The tax will gener-
ate revenues to help support health care 
reform. But it will do more than that by 
creating incentives to purchase health 
insurance.
The Supreme Court, in its early ju-
risprudence, expressed concern about 
federal taxes designed to punish or regu-
late rather than to raise revenue. Thus, 
the Court distinguished between reve-
nue-raising taxes, which it upheld, and 
purely regulatory taxes, which it found 
constitutionally troubling. The distinc-
tion, however, has all but disappeared. 
For example, the Court has upheld 
federal taxes on concealed firearms and 
the medical prescribing of marijuana, 
stating that a “tax does not cease to be 
valid because it regulates, discourages, 
or even definitely deters the activities 
taxed.”9
Today, a federal tax is likely to be 
constitutional unless it regulates behav-
ior in a way extraneous to any tax need. 
The act’s tax penalty is clearly constitu-
tional because it helps pay the costs of 
reform (such as Medicaid expansion, 
health insurance subsidies, and state in-
surance exchanges) and corrects market 
failures (such as preexisting condition 
exclusions). The mandate, therefore, is 
essential for expanding access—the rai-
son d’être of health care reform.
Critics claim the tax penalty simply 
avoids the political costs of raising in-
come taxes to pay for social programs. 
But the state frequently and appropriate-
ly raises revenue for beneficial activities 
by taxing risky behaviors like smoking, 
drinking alcohol, and gambling. By do-
ing so, the tax pays for a valuable service 
while discouraging unhealthy behav-
ior—exactly what Congress intended 
with the health insurance mandate.
Why the Mandate Is Vital
The state lawsuits are widely expect-ed to reach a conservative-leaning, 
business-friendly Supreme Court some-
time in 2011. The litigation may falter 
on procedural grounds: “ripeness” (the 
lawsuits were filed four years before the 
mandate takes effect, so plaintiffs can-
not demonstrate current injury and can 
merely speculate whether they will be 
harmed) or “standing” (states have little 
stake in federal decisions to mandate in-
dividuals to purchase insurance).
If the Court were to reach the merits 
and invalidate the mandate, however, 
comprehensive health care reform could 
unravel. In theory, the mandate could 
be severed from the rest of the act’s 
two-thousand-plus pages, but the spon-
sors rightly saw it as integral to reform. 
Private insurance companies could not, 
and would not, cover high-risk individ-
uals unless they could spread the costs 
among a wide pool. And unless young, 
healthy people were given incentives to 
join the pool, they would opt out. They 
opt out now. And with the new ban on 
preexisting condition exclusions, they 
would have even more reason to delay 
buying insurance, as they could sim-
ply wait until they become ill. Absent 
a mandate, the insurance market would 
become highly dysfunctional.
Comprehensive health care reform 
envisages a social contract where every-
one shares the cost; one that recognizes 
all of us may become ill one day. The 
mandate is not an unjustified limit on 
freedom, but rather is vital to a decent 
society. If the social contract must be 
accomplished the “American way”—
through the private system—then the 
simple logic of insurance has to prevail, 
which is to spread the risk among every-
one—rich and poor, healthy and sick, 
young and old alike. And for that to 
happen, the judiciary will have to up-
hold the individual purchase mandate.
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